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Abstract
The Cumulative Prospect Theory, as it was speciﬁed by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) does not explain the St Petersburg Paradox. This study shows that the solu-
tions proposed in the literature (Blavatskky, 2005; Rieger and Wang, 2006) to guar-
antee, under rank dependant models, ﬁnite subjective utilities for any prospects with
ﬁnite expected values have to cope with many limitations. In that framework, CPT
fails to accommodate both gambling and insurance behavior. We suggested to replace
the weighting function generally proposed in the literature with another speciﬁcation
which respects the following properties. 1) In order to guarantee ﬁnite subjective val-
ues for all prospects with ﬁnite expected values, the slope at zero should be ﬁnite. 2)To
account for the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, the probability weighting should be
strong enough to overcome the concavity of the value function.
Keywords : St Petersburg Paradox, Cumulative Prospect Theory, Probability
Weighting, Gambling.
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11 Introduction
The St. Petersburg Paradox posed in 1713 by Nicholas Bernoulli shows that for prospects
with inﬁnite expected monetary value decision makers are not willing to pay an inﬁnite
sum of money. This observation can be taken as an evidence against expected value theory.
In fact, according to this theory introduced by Blaise Pascal, individuals evaluate risky
prospects by their expected value. So any decision-maker should accept to pay an inﬁnite
amount of money for prospects with inﬁnite expected value. In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli
solved the paradox by introducing the idea of diminishing marginal utility. He postulated
that individuals valuate prospects not by their expected value but by their expected utility
where utility is not linearly related to outcomes but increases at a decreasing rate. So if we
consider that individuals preferences are represented by a strictly increasing and concave
utility function this paradox can be solved. Since this date, the expected utility (EU)
theory was considered (for many years) as a benchmark for describing decision making
under risk.
However, the Allais paradox (1953) and many other experimental studies (Slovic
et Lichtenstein, 1968; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) report persistent violations of EU
theory. Moreover its predictions of behavior are seriously questioned. On the one hand,
individuals preferences for insurance lead to a risk-averse behavior. On the other hand,
acceptance of gambling indicates risk-seeking behavior. Two conﬂicting behavioral choices
are therefore observed. The cumulative prospect theory (CPT) developed by Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) was then proposed as an alternative model to the well established ex-
pected utility model. This theory is based on 4 important features: 1) Utility is deﬁned
over gains and losses rather than over ﬁnal asset position. So risky prospects are evaluated
relatively to a reference point. This reference point corresponds to the asset position one
expects to reach. 2) The sensitivity relatively to the reference point is decreasing. The
value function is then concave for gains and convex for losses. 3) Individuals have asym-
metric perception of gains and losses: they are loss-adverse, hence the value function is
steeper for losses than for gains. 4) Individuals do not use objective probabilities when
evaluating risky prospects. They transform objective probabilities via a weighting func-
tion. They overweight the small probabilities of extreme outcomes (events at the upper tail
of the distribution). Conversely, they underweight outcomes with average probabilities.
CPT stands for one of the most well-accepted alternatives to expected utility theory
because its predictions of behavior are consistent with the recently accumulated empirical
evidence on individual preferences. Although this model overwhelmed the EU predictions
of behavior, it must cope with other types of diﬃculties. Blavatskky (2005) emphasized
an intrinsic limitation of that model. The overweighting of small probabilities can lead
2to the re-occurrence of the St Petersburg Paradox. He showed that the valuation of a
prospect (the subjective utility) by cumulative prospect theory can be inﬁnite. However
it is important to notice that this dilemma is not speciﬁc to rank dependent models
such as CPT. It is now well known that even in expected utility framework the Bernoulli’s
resolution of the paradox is unsatisfactory. Actually, in EU framework, that is to say when
individuals do not transform probabilities, the introduction of a concave utility function
can resolve the paradox as it was introduced by N. Bernoulli. But the game can be modiﬁed
(by making prizes grow suﬃciently fast) so that the concavity of the utility function is
not suﬃcient to guarantee a ﬁnite expected utility value1. Arrow proposed to resolve this
problem by only considering distributions with ﬁnite expected value. In that case, the
concavity of the utility function is suﬃcient to guarantee, under EU framework, a ﬁnite
valuation. This assumption is quite realistic because none individuals or organizations
can oﬀer a prospect with inﬁnite expected value. However, we cannot implement it under
CPT framework. In fact, in cumulative prospect theory, a prospect with ﬁnite expected
value can have an inﬁnite subjective value (Rieger and Wang, 2006).
The purpose of the present paper is to determine how we can solve this paradox.
Blavatskky (2005) and Rieger and Wang (2006) have already proposed some solutions to
guarantee ﬁnite subjective values for all prospects with ﬁnite expected value. In this study,
we explore the behavioral implications of these propositions. We establish that if we take
them into account, the modiﬁed cumulative prospect theory is not anymore consistent
with some behavior observed on the market. For example, there are situations where the
CPT modiﬁed by these propositions cannot anymore accommodate both gambling and
insurance behavior.
The paper is structured as follow: Section II reviews the cumulative prospect the-
ory model paying particular attention to the functional form of the value and weighting
function. In section III, we present how the paradox occurs under CPT and report the
solutions derived by Blavatskyy (2005) and Rieger and Wang (2006) to resolve it. Section
IV analyses the behavioral implications of these propositions. In section V, we propose a
more appropriate solution to this paradox. Section VI concludes with a summary of our
ﬁndings.
2 Cumulative Prospect Theory
In this section we brieﬂy present the cumulative prospect theory formalized by Tversky
and Kahneman in 1992. In a ﬁrst version (1979) Kahneman and Tversky supposed that
decision makers transform individual probabilities directly via a weighting function. This
1This super paradox was ﬁrst illustrated by Menger (1934).
3assumption leads to preferences that violate the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance criteria.
In the cumulative version, they took into account Quiggin and Yaari’s work and applied
the probability weighting function to the cumulative probability distribution. Therefore,
while attitude towards risk is fully characterized by the value function under expected
utility theory, under cumulative prospect theory, attitude towards risk is determined si-
multaneously by the value function and the cumulative weighing function.
Consider a prospect X deﬁned by:
X = ((xi,pi)i = −m,....n)
with x−m < x−m+1 < .... < x0 = 0 < x1 < x2 < ... < xn.
We have mentioned previously that gains and losses are evaluated diﬀerently by individu-
als. In order to take into account this assumption, the evaluation function V of a prospect
X is deﬁned by:
V (X) = V (X+) + V (X−)












where v is a strictly increasing value function deﬁned with respect to a reference point
satisfying v(x0) = v(0) = 0.
π+ = (π+
0 ,....π+
n ) and π− = (π−
−m,,....π−







i = w+(pi + ..... + pn) − w+(pi+1 + ..... + pn) with 0 ≤ i ≤ n-1
π−
i = w−(p−m + ..... + pi) − w−(p−m + ..... + pi−1) with − m ≤ i ≤ 0
4with w+(0) = 0 = w−(0) and w+(1) = 1 = w−(1)
Consider F the cumulative distribution function of X. We notice that w+(pi) is applied




pj) = w+(1 − F(xi−1))









xα if x > 0
−λ(−x)−β if x < 0

For 0 < α < 1 and 0 < β < 1 the value function v is concave over gains and convex over
losses. It is kinked at the origin and steeper for losses than for gains. The parameter λ
describes the degree of loss aversion K¨ obberling and Wakker (2005). Based on experimen-
tal evidences, Tversky and Kahneman estimated the values of the parameters α, β, and λ
α = β = 0.88 and λ = 2.25.
They proposed the following functional form for the weighting function:
w+(p) =
pγ+
[pγ+ + (1 − p)γ+]1/γ+ w−(p) =
pγ−
[pγ− + (1 − p)γ−]1/γ−
For γ < 1, this functional form integrates the overweighting of low probabilities and
the greater sensitivity for changes in probabilities for extremely low and extremely high
probabilities. The weighting function is concave near 0 and convex near 1. Tversky and
Kahneman estimated the parameters γ+ and γ− as 0.61 and 0.69.
53 The St Petersburg Paradox
The St Petersburg Paradox is usually explained by the following example: Let’s consider
a gamble L in which the player gets 2n euros when the coins lands heads for the ﬁrst time
at the nth throw. L has an inﬁnite expected value.
E(L) = 1
2 × 2 + (1
2)2 × 22 + ........ + (1
2)n × 2n + ...... =
∞ X
k=1
1 = +∞ (1)
According to number of experiments, the maximum price an individual is willing to pay
for this gamble is around 3 euros. This observation can be taken as an evidence against
expected value theory. Daniel Bernoulli (1738) proposed to replace in (1) the monetary
value of each outcome with their subjective utility (where the subjective utilities are rep-
resented by a strictly concave utility function). In that framework the strictly concave





2)k × ln(2k) = 2ln2 < +∞ (2)
This solution permits to solve this particular paradox. Since this resolution, expected
utility theory became, for more than 200 years, the major model of choices under risk.
However, empirical evidences have recently showed that EU theory fails to provide a good
explanation of individual behavior under risk. These observations have motivated the
development of alternative models of choices. One of the most famous is the cumulative
prospect theory (presented in the previous section) developed by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992).
Even if this model is deemed to be one of the best alternatives to EU theory, it also
has to deal with some diﬃculties. Actually, Blavatskky (2005) established that, under
CPT, the overweighting of small probabilities restores the St Petersburg Paradox. Under






















In section 2, we underline that the functional forms proposed for v and w by Tversky and
Kahneman are v(x) = xα with α > 0 and w(p) = pγ/(pγ + (1 − p)γ)1/γ with 0 < γ < 1.
6As lim
n−→+∞
21−n = 0 and lim
n−→+∞
21−n = 0, [pγ + (1 − p)γ]1/γconverges to unity. In that
case, the function w, speciﬁed by Tversky and Kahneman, can then be approximated by
pγ. According to these elements we can rewrite V (L) as:







20,27n −→ +∞ (4)
One can object that this paradox does not involve a real problem insofar as the expected
value of this game is inﬁnite. Actually, it is not realist to assume that an institution
can oﬀer a prospect with unlimited expected value (Arrow, 1974). However, Pﬁﬀelmann
(2007) and Rieger and Wang (2006) pointed out that, under CPT, a prospect with ﬁnite
expected value can have inﬁnite subjective utility. Such a result is possible because the
weighting function has an inﬁnite slope at zero. Therefore, the more the probability is
low, the more the overweighting is important. An extremely small probability can thus be
inﬁnitely overweighted. As the value function is unbounded, there are situations for which
the subjective value of a consequence weighted by its decision weight can be inﬁnitely
high.
Rieger et Wang (2006) characterized situations where this problem can be resolved.
They focused on ﬁtting parameterized functional forms to CPT’s functions and determined
for which parameter combinations the model implies ﬁnite subjective value for all lotteries
with ﬁnite expected value.














where the value function v is continuous, monotone, convex for x < 0 and concave for x









β = v2 ∈ (0,+∞)
2For more details on the demonstration see Rieger and Wand (2006).
7Assume that the weighting functions w are continuous and strictly increasing from [0,1]
to [0,1] such that w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. Moreover, assume that w is continuously












(1 − y)γ+−1 = w2 ∈ (0,+∞)
Consider p a probability distribution for which E(p) < ∞. If all the conditions described
above are satisﬁed V (p) is ﬁnite if α < γ+ et β < γ−.
Thus if we consider the Tversky and Kahneman’s speciﬁcation for the value and weighting
functions, the valuation of any prospect by CPT will be ﬁnite only if α < γ+ and β <
γ−. The estimates of α, β, γ+and γ− are usually obtained from parametric ﬁtting to
experimental data. The estimated parameters realized by Camerer and Ho (1994) and Wu
and Gonzales (1996) are the only one that are consistent with these conditions. In that
case, the concavity of the value function is suﬃciently strong relative to the probability
weighting function to avoid the St Petersburg Paradox.
Rieger and Wang (2006) proposed another solution to avoid the paradox under
CPT. They suggested to consider a polynomial of degree three as a weighting function.
The speciﬁcation is given by:
w(p) =
3 − 3b
a2 − a + 1
× (p3 − (a + 1)p2 + ap) + p (6)
with a ∈ (0,1) et b ∈ (0,1).
As its slope at zero is ﬁnite, this weighting function permits to avoid inﬁnite subjective
utilities for all prospects with ﬁnite expected value.
84 The behavioral implications of the solutions proposed in
the literature
If we take into account the propositions described above, the St Petersburg Paradox will
not occur under CPT. But at the same time, this theory will loose a major part of its
descriptive power.
4.1 The Camerer and Ho’s (1994) and Wu and Gonzales’ (1996) esti-
mates
Rieger and Wang (2006) established that prospects with ﬁnite expected value will not
have inﬁnite subjective utility if the power coeﬃcient of the value function is lower than
the power coeﬃcient of the probability weighting function. Two parameterized versions
of CPT are consistent with this condition (Camerer and Ho, 1994; Wu and Gonzales,
1996). Accepting them will solve the paradox. However, they generate other kind of
diﬃculties. Actually, these parameterizations of CPT cannot anymore accommodate the
four-fold pattern of risk attitude (risk aversion for most gains and low probability losses,
and risk seeking for most losses and low probability gains). For example, these versions of
CPT fail to capture the gambling behavior observed on the market and more precisely the
tendency of individuals to bet on unlikely gains (Neilson et Stowe, 2002). This pattern is
still one of the most fundamental contributions of CPT as it was developed by Tversky and
Kahneman. But it can emerge only if the probability weighting over-ride the curvature
of the value function (for low probabilities). In fact, in rank dependant models, gambling
behavior can be captured only if the overweighting of probabilities is strong enough to
compensate the concavity of the value function. When α is lower than γ3, the convexity of
the weighting function cannot overcome the concavity of the value function. In that case,
optimism generated by the weighting function does not oﬀset risk aversion resulting from
the value function. It is thus impossible to account for gambling behavior4. If we consider
a value function whose power coeﬃcient is lower than the coeﬃcient of the probability
weighting function (as it is suggested by Rieger and Wang), CPT does not restore the
St Petersburg Paradox but in return it does not provide a good description of individual
behavior under risk.
3For all usual estimates of γ.
4This fact is illustrated in appendice. We show that with the Camerer and Ho’s and Wu and Gonzales’
estimates the choice behavior under CPT is not consistent with the very famous lottery games euromillions.
94.2 The Rieger and Wang’s polynomial function
4.2.1 Limitations of the speciﬁcation
We underline previously that considering a polynomial weighting function instead of the
Tversky and Kahneman’s speciﬁcation can solve the paradox. The functional form pro-
posed by Rieger and Wang is given by:
w(p) =
3 − 3b
a2 − a + 1
× (p3 − (a + 1)p2 + ap) + p
with a ∈ (0,1) et b ∈ (0,1).
As its slope at zero and unity is ﬁnite, the subjective utility of any ﬁnite expected
value prospects will be ﬁnite. However, as the solution proposed above, the behavioral
implication of this new speciﬁcation of CPT does not allow for betting on unlikely gains.
The highest slope of this function at zero (when b = 0 and a = 1) is actually equal to 4,
which is too low. The small probabilities are then not enough overweighted. Therefore the
model modiﬁed by the Rieger and Wang’s weighting function do not imply that individuals
insure against unlikely losses or bet on unlikely gains. In order to illustrate this fact, we
apply CPT (the version proposed by Tversky and Kahneman and the one modiﬁed by
Rieger and Wang) to the most popular European lottery: Euromillion. We obtain that
with the modiﬁcation operated by Rieger and Wang, CPT cannot anymore explain the
popularity of this very famous game.
4.2.2 Illustration: the case of Euromillions
Euromillions is a unique lottery game played every Friday by hundreds of millions of
players throughout Europe. One can play by using a playslip that contains six sets of
main boards and lucky star boards. Each player selects ﬁve numbers on a main board
and two numbers on the associated lucky start board to make one entry. A Euromillions
lottery ticket costs euro 2. 50% of the money paid for a ticket goes directly to the operator
selling it (in France euro 1 of every euro 2 ticket a player buy will go to the ”Francaise
des Jeux”). The remaining 50% of ticket fees goes into the ”Common Prize Fund” out of
which all prizes are paid. Table 1 represents the percentage share of the fund allocated to
each prize with the corresponding probabilities5.
We apply the two versions of CPT (the original and the one developed by Rieger
and Wang) to this European game. In order to determine the average monetary game
5We assume that all the booster fund is devoted to the ﬁrst rank.
10Table 1: Euromillions
gains rank % Prize Fund Probability
1st rank 32%+6% 1
76 275 360
2nd rank 7.4% 1
5 448 240
3th rank 2.1% 1
3 632 160
4th rank 1.5% 1
339 002
5th rank 1% 1
24 214
6th rank 0.7% 1
16 143
7th rank 1% 1
7 705
8th rank 5.1% 1
550
9th rank 4.4% 1
538
10th rank 4.7% 1
367
11th rank 10.1% 1
102
12th rank 24% 1
38
for each winner at each rank, we assume a number of participants equal to 40 millions
(so a prize fund also equal to 40 millions)6. The probability to win at the second rank is
1
5 448 240
, so on average there are 7 winners at this rank. The average gain per winner is
then equal to:
40 000 000 × 7.4%
7
= 422 857.14. Table 2 displays the results of the game’s
valuation by CPT and CPT modiﬁed7.
Table 2: Euromillions Valuation





1st rank 1.311×10−8 15 200 000 2 089 403.44 1.55501×10−5 2.34607×10−8
2nd rank 1.835×10−7 422 857.14 89 340.55 6.55653×10−5 3.2845×10−7
3th rank 2.753×10−7 76 363.63 19 012.08 5.72386×10−5 4.92674×10−7
4th rank 2.949×10−6 5 128.2 1839.16 0.00032463 5.27862×10−6
5th rank 4.129×10−5 242.27 124.46 0.00175136 7.38969×10−5
6th rank 6.194×10−5 113.03 63.09 0.00153935 0.000110825
7th rank 0.0001297 77.05 44.7 0.00232386 0.000232125
8th rank 0.0018181 28.05 17.61 0.0160782 0.003242095
9th rank 0.0018587 23.67 14.98 0.0101514 0.003295609
10th rank 0.0027247 17.25 10.99 0.0115014 0.004796966
11th rank 0.0098039 10.30 6.44 0.0290591 0.016926816
12th rank 0.0263157 9.12 5.62 0.048556 0.042932219
No gain 0.9572 0 -4.14 0.86336 0.912226886
V(X) 37.94 -3.14
The valuation of the game with cumulative prospect theory, as it was developed by
Tversky and Kahneman, is positive. But if we substitute the inverse S- shape probability
6The prize fund reached euro 38 734 739 the 12 October 2007, and euro 50 916 665 the 20 September.
7We consider a reference point of euro 2.
11weighting function speciﬁed by Tversky and Kahneman with the one proposed by Rieger
and Wang8 the subjective utility becomes negative. Decision makers who transform proba-
bilities via the polynomial weighting function would prefer keeping the price of the lottery
ticket rather than participate in the lottery. This new version of CPT is therefore not able
to explain the popularity of public lotteries. This limitation is quite severe, since betting
on unlikely gains is one of the most important stylized facts that cumulative prospect
theory aims to predict.
5 An alternative weighting function
Section III underlines that CPT should be remodeled if we want to apply it to problems of
choices. The occurrence of the paradoxe under CPT comes from the overweighting of small
probabilities. As the slope of the weighting function at zero is inﬁnity, an extremely small
probability can be inﬁnitely overweighted. And as the slope of the value function do not
decrease for the high values of outcomes, the subjective value of a consequence weighted by
its decision weight can be inﬁnitely high. In order to overcome this diﬃculty, we propose
an alternative weighting function that avoids inﬁnite values for subjective utility. This
function should respect the following properties:
1. w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1
2. w strictly increasing on [0,1].
3. w continuously diﬀerentiable on [0,1], with w0(0) et w0(1) 6= ∞. We underlined
previously that if the slope at zero is too low, CPT cannot accommodate the gam-
bling and insurance behavior observed on the market. Therefore w0(0) should be
suﬃciently strong.
5.1 A polynomial speciﬁcation
Before attempting to build a new weighting function, it is important to clarify a point.
The evidences presented previously criticize the way probabilities are transformed near 0
and 1 with the weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman. These evidences
challenge the speciﬁcation of the function but not the experimental data Tversky and
Kahneman have obtained. In fact, the problem does not concern the individual preferences
they have elicited but the functional form of the function. We agree (and there is no doubt
about that) that an inverse S shape weighting function, ﬁrst concave then convex really
8In table 2, we took for the computation of π: a = 0.4 and b = 0.5. Nevertheless, the same result (a
negative valuation) is obtained with any other combinations of a and b.
12represents the way individuals transform probabilities. The diﬃculties related to the use
of the Tversky and Kahneman’s weighting function only concerns its slope at 0 and 1. To
overcome them, we consider a polynomial weighting function because the slope of this kind
of speciﬁcations is always ﬁnite within the interval considered. As we do not challenge the
experimental results Tversky and Kahneman have obtained, we estimate the coeﬃcients of
the polynomial from the points of the functional they have proposed. We remind that the
slope at zero must be suﬃciently strong to overcome the slope of the value function. Other
than CPT won’t be able to explain preferences for gambling and insurance. Therefore we
cannot consider a simple functional as the polynomial of degree three proposed by Rieger
and Wang. Actually if we process to a polynomial approximation at the order three, the
slope at zero won’t be strong enough to accommodate gambling and insurance behavior. A
solution would consist in considering a polynomial characterized partly by small exponents
because it permits to well captured the overweighting of small probabilities. In this work,
we set the values of the exponents so that the curve is as close as possible to the original
curve. Let the weighting function given by:
w(p) = ap + bp1.1 + cp1.15 + dp1.2 + ep2 + fp2.5 + gp6
with a + b + c + d + e + f + g = 1 such as w(1) = 1.
According to these elements we can rewrite w as :
w(p) = ap + bp1.1 + cp1.15 + dp1.2 + ep2 + fp2.5 + (1 − a − b − c − d − e − f)p6
w(p) − p6 = a(p − p6) + b(p1.1 − p6) + c(p1.15 − p6) + d(p1.2 − p6) + e(p2 − p6) + j(p2.5 − p6)
y = ax1 + bx2 + cx3 + dx4 + ex5 + fx6
with y = w(p) − p6, x1 = (p − p6), ....,.x6 = (p2.5 − p6)
In order to estimate the coeﬃcients a,...., f, we built 1027 observations from the Tversky
and Kahneman’s weighting function9. Table 3 (respectively 4) displays the results of the
estimates for gains (respectively losses)10.
9We assume that γ
+ = 0,61 et γ
− = 0,69.
10To test the stability of the coeﬃcients, we realized 14 regressions by removing randomly 5% of the
observations. We mainly focused on a which represents the slope of the function at zero. For gains, its
average estimate is 2215.45 and the standard error equals to 1.70%.
In this study, we kept the estimate the closest to the mean.
13Table 3: Results of the estimates for gains
Variable Coeﬃcient T-Stat Prob
x1 2 215.004 14.98 0.000
x2 -19 080.29 -15.23 0.000
x3 30 702.47 15.39 0.000
x4 -13 963.80 -15.55 0.000
x5 202.1941 18.84 0.000
x6 -76.95053 -20.95 0.000
Table 4: Results of the estimates for losses
Variable Coeﬃcient T-Stat Prob
x1 1295.432 15.57 0.000
x2 -11 162.53 -15.73 0.000
x3 17 972.97 15.91 0.000
x4 -8 180.233 -16.09 0.000
x5 119.3246 19.67 0.000
x6 -45.40450 -21.9 0.000
The weighting function is thus given by:
w(p) = 2215,003p − 19080,29p1,1 + 30702,47p1,15 − 13963,8p1,2
+202,1941p2 − 76,95053p2,5 + 2,37243p6
This functional form has a ﬁnite slope at zero and one. It is strictely increasing on [0,1]
and satisﬁes the overweighting of small probabilities and underweighting of moderate and
high probabilities.
5.2 A non-polynomial form
We underline previously that the limitations of the weighting function proposed by Tversky
and Kahneman only concerns its slope at 0 and 1. Concerning the remainder of the interval,
this speciﬁcation perfectly characterizes attitudes towards probabilities. We can thus keep
the global framework of these functional form and modify it lightly in a such way that the
slopes at the extremities of the interval are not anymore inﬁnite.
Let this functional form be given by:
w1(p) =
(p + a)γ1




14with a = 0 + ε , wT+K(a) = b and 0,3 < γ1 < 1.
This speciﬁcation is stepest near zero and shallower in the middle. It satisﬁes the properties
of subadditivity and is ﬁrst concave then convex. The condition w1(0) = 0 is satisﬁed. At








(1 − a)−1+γ1 − a−1+γ1
((1 − a)γ1 + a+γ1)γ1)

Note that on [1−a, 1], w1(p) is not deﬁned. We have to modiﬁy the speciﬁcation for high
values of p. Let’s consider this functional form:
w2(p) =
(p − c)γ2




with c = 0 + ε , d such as w2(1) = 1 and w2 strictly increasing and convex.
The weighting function can thus be given by:
w(p) =
(p + a)γ1
[(p + a)γ1 + (1 − (p + a))γ1]
1
γ1
− b pour p ∈ [0,h]
=
(p − c)γ2
[(p − c)γ2 + (1 − (p − c))γ2]
1
γ2
+ d pour p ∈]h,1]
The value of h is chosen in such a way that w is strictly increasing on [0, 1]. h is thus
the solution of: w1(p) = w2(p). w is ﬁrst strictly concave and then strictly convex only
if γ1 > γ2
11. At last, as the slope at 1 and 0 is identical in the speciﬁcation proposed by
Tversky and Kahneman, we assume that w0
1(0) = w0
2(1).
In this study we set the values of a and c in such a way that the slope at 0 and
1 equals to 2 200 for gains and 1 300 for losses. These values are not arbitrarily chosen
but correspond to the slopes we have obtained in the previous section. Thus for gains, we
determine a and c by resolving the following system:








(1 − a)−1+γ1 − a−1+γ1
((1 − a)γ1 + a+γ1)γ1)

= 2200





(1 − c)γ2 × c − cγ2 + c1+γ2
(c − 1) × c
= 2200
Applying the same method for losses, we obtain the following weighting function:
w+
1 (p) =
(p + 7.57 × 10−10)0.61
[(p + 7.57 × 10−10)0.61 + (1 − (p + 7.57 × 10−10))0.61]
1
0.61
− 2.7307 × 10−6
for p ∈ [0;0.9999999]
w+
2 (p) =
(p − 5.585 × 10−9)0.6
[(p − 5.585 × 10−9)0.6 + (1 − (p − 5.585 × 10−9))0.6]
1
0.6




(p + 2.721 × 10−11)0.69
[(p + 2.721 × 10−11)0.69 + (1 − (p + 2.721 × 10−11))0.69]
1
0.69
− 5.1281 × 10−8
for p ∈ [0;0.9999999987]
w−
2 (p) =
(p − 1.8549 × 10−10)0.68
[(p − 1.8549 × 10−10)0.68 + (1 − (p − 1.8549 × 10−10))0.68]
1
0.68
+ 3.547 × 10−7
pour p ∈]0.9999999987;1]
The speciﬁcation of these two weighting functions has a ﬁnite slope at zero. It
permits to avoid inﬁnite subjective utility and thus overcomes the diﬃculties linked to the
use of rank dependant models. These functional forms do not imply, as the one proposed
16by Rieger and Wang, no risk seeking behavior over unlikely gains and no risk aversion
over unlikely losses. The slope at zero is suﬃciently strong: the probability weighting can
then over ride the curvature of the value function. CPT does not fail to explain gambling
behavior12.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this study was to determine how we can solve the St Petersburg Paradox in
rank dependant models. First, we established that the solutions proposed in the literature
lead to other kind of diﬃculties. We underlined that if we take them into account, the
probability weighting won’t be strong enough to compensate the concavity of the value
function. In that case, CPT cannot accomodate both gambling and insurance behavior.
This theory will then loose a major part of its descriptive power. In a second part, we
proposed an alternative way to ﬁx the inﬁnite subjective utility’s problem. As Rieger and
Wang (2006), we suggested to consider an alternative weighting function whose slope at
zero is not inﬁnite. In that case, the subjective value of any prospects won’t be inﬁnitely
high. Nevertheless, in order to preserve the fourforld pattern of risk attitudes, we set a
speciﬁcation whose shape dominates (for low probabilities) the value function. Thanks to
this requirement, the overweighting of small probabilities reverses risk averse (respectively
risk seeking) behavior for gains (respectively losses) generated by the value function. CPT
won’t fail to to provide a good description of individual behavior under risk.
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Appendice
Table 5 displays the results of euromillions’ valuation by CPT with Camerer and
Ho (1994) and Wu and Gonzales (1996) estimates13.
13We consider a reference point of euro 2.










1.311×10−8 15 200 000 454.236 3.85332×10−5 5426.9851 2.5322×10−6
1.835×10−7 422 857.14 120.695 0.000136992 842.59648 1.478610−5
2.753×10−7 76 363.63 64.07134 0.000111006 346.01515 1.4926×10−5
2.949×10−6 5 128.2 23.58438 0.000581451 84.936411 9.935×10−5
4.129×10−5 242.27 7.60087 0.002775051 17.296997 0.0006838
6.194×10−5 113.03 5.7125 0.002260728 11.578418 0.0006947
0.0001297 77.05 4.94189 0.003262787 9.4449954 0.0011434
0.0018181 28.05 3.340792 0.020489824 5.4477971 0.0095197
0.0018587 23.67 3.120927 0.01197572 4.9507266 0.0069054
0.0027247 17.25 2.740316 0.01302709 4.1237036 0.0084206
0.0098039 10.30 2.188255 0.0311254 3.0059076 0.0235416
0.0263157 9.12 2.067367 0.04819050 2.7751710 0.0451533
0.9572 0 -2.90779 0.7638842 -3.226399 0.8742871
V(X) -1.80 -2.43
In both case the subjective utility of one Euromillions ticket is negative. We can gen-
eralize this result and show (for any value of γ greater than 0.4) that if we consider a
power coeﬃcient for the value function greater than the power coeﬃcient of the weighting
function, the subjective utility of this game is always negative.
Table 6 displays the results of euromillions’ valuation by considering the weighting
functions deﬁned in section 514.
Table 6: Euromillions Valuation
Probabilities Gains v(xi) π1
i π2
i
1.311×10−8 15 200 000 2 089 403.44 9.90096×10−6 1.3371×10−6
1.835×10−7 422 857.14 89 340.55 9.50558×10−5 6.5217×10−5
2.753×10−7 76 363.63 19 012.08 0.00011415 5.7184×10−5
2.949×10−6 5 128.2 1839.16 0.000864002 0.0003245
4.129×10−5 242.27 124.46 0.005956235 0.0017513
6.194×10−5 113.03 63.09 0.005239292 0.0015393
0.0001297 77.05 44.7 0.007202387 0.0023238
0.0018181 28.05 17.61 0.029688009 0.0160782
0.0018587 23.67 14.98 0.00833742 0.0101514
0.0027247 17.25 10.99 0.00547187 0.0115014
0.0098039 10.30 6.44 0.01083462 0.0290591
0.0263157 9.12 5.62 0.0373534 0.0485568
0.9572 0 -4.14 0.8862328 0.8633637
V(X) 31.74 33.36
14We consider a reference point of euro 2.
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